



IDENTIFYING MINORITY COMMUNITIES AND PERSONS 
BELONGING TO NATIONAL MINORITIES IN LIGHT OF THE 






In the course of the various monitoring procedures by 
international and national expert bodies and non-
governmental organizations, it has become a common 
finding that many rights exist only on paper. Especially 
regarding human rights and minority rights can we 
experience the sometimes painful difference between the 
legal provisions and their actual implementation. In 
Hungary and in most democratic countries, the supreme 
protection of the rights of minorities is the responsibility 
of the Constitutional Court. To put it differently, the 
successful implementation of the “law in books” largely 
depends on this highly respected judicial body. In 
addition, it is the author’s firm belief – although not 
examined in this paper – that the Court’s opinion, 
conveyed by judgements on minority issues, may have a 
                                                 
1 Assistant Professor, National University of Public Service 
(Budapest), Faculty of Public Governance and International Studies, 
Department of International Law. 
2 The research has been carried out as part of the programs of the 
Ministry of Justice enhancing the level of legal education. 
 37
strong influence on how minority rights are perceived 
and valued by the legal scholarship as well as 
practitioners, or even by the public. 
 
This paper presents the initial results of a two-year 
international research project, during which I intend to 
critically evaluate the role of the Constitutional Court of 
Hungary in the protection of national minorities, by 
meticulously analysing all court cases relevant to 
minority rights. Ultimately, I seek to answer the 
following questions: Are minority rights guaranteed by 
the Constitution effectively protected by the 
Constitutional Court? If not, what are the reasons for the 
lack of effective legal protection? How does the 
Constitutional Court define minority rights and its own 
role in their protection? What are the main challenges 
and future prospects for the protection of minority rights 
in the practice of the Constitutional Court? 
 
During the three decades of its operation, the 
Constitutional Court of Hungary decided approximately 
10 000 cases in sum. Only about 30, that is less than 1% 
of these are related to minority rights.3 In these cases, the 
Court has essentially dealt with three issues: 1. What is a 
minority? More specifically, what does the constitutional 
term “constituent part of the State” mean, and can certain 
                                                 
3 The full texts of the decisions discussed in this paper are available 
(in Hungarian) at the official website of the Constitutional Court of 
Hungary: https://www.alkotmanybirosag.hu/ugykereso/ Translations 
of excerpts from the decisions and orders of the Constitutional Court 
have been prepared by the author. 
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ethnic groups seeking recognition be considered 
minorities? 2. Who belongs to a minority? That is, who 
is to be recognised as a holder of minority rights, and 
what are the rules for minority self-identification? 3. 
What are minority rights? This means the exploration of 
the content of specific rights for persons belonging to 
minorities set out in the Constitution, the 
Minorities/Nationalities Act and other legislation, 
including the right to representation of minorities 
(parliamentary and municipal), the legal status of 
minority self-governments, and certain language rights. 
In this paper, only those cases will be addressed which 
concern the first two questions, i.e. the definition and 
recognition of minority groups, and the identification of 
those persons who are entitled to minority rights. 
Answering the third question, i.e. the exploration of the 
content of specific minority rights, and the overall 
evaluation of the Constitutional Court of Hungary will 
be the subject-matter of another paper, forthcoming in 
the second edited book of our research group. 
 
 
2. The legal framework of minority protection in 
Hungary 
 
People belonging to national minorities in Hungary 
currently make up approx. 8-10 % of the population 
according to scientific estimates, and 6,5 % according to 
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official census data.4 The distribution of minority 
population is as follows: Roma – 315 583, Germans – 
185 696, Romanians – 35 641, Slovaks – 35 208, Croats 
– 26 774, Serbs – 10 038, Ukrainians – 7 396, Poles – 
7 001, Bulgarians – 6 272, Greeks – 4 642, Ruthenians – 
3 882, Armenians – 3 571, Slovenes – 2 820; in total: 
644 524 people.5 
 
The presence of minority communities in the territory of 
the country is not a recent phenomenon, on the contrary. 
Hungary has been a multinational and multilingual state 
since its very establishment (AD 1000), and although the 
various peoples of the country had lived in peaceful 
coexistence for centuries, managing the diverse needs of 
nationalities became increasingly difficult by the end of 
the 19th century.6 Some have even argued that the very 
dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy – and the 
Kingdom of Hungary as part of it – was due to the 
                                                 
4 KÖZPONTI STATISZTIKAI HIVATAL [Central Statistical Office of 
Hungary]: 2011. évi népszámlálás, 9. Nemzetiségi adatok [2011 
Census, 9. Data on nationalities]. Budapest, 2013. 15. Available 
online:  
http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/nepsz2011/nepsz_09_201
1.pdf  (Last accessed: 1 November 2019)  
5 Ibid. 
6 BINDORFFER, Györgyi: Nemzetiségi politika Magyarországon 
Szent István korától a rendszerváltozásig. In: Gyulavári Tamás – 
Kállai Ernő (eds.): A jövevényektől az államalkotó tényezőkig. A 
nemzetiségi közösségek múltja és jelene Magyarországon. 
Országgyűlési Biztos Hivatala, Budapest, 2010. 10–48.; Nagy 
Noémi: A hatalom nyelve – a nyelv hatalma: Nyelvi jog és 
nyelvpolitika Európa történetében. Budapest, Dialóg Campus 
Kiadó–Nordex Kft, 2019, 251 p. 
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State’s failure to accommodate its linguistic and ethnic 
diversity.7 After a relatively calm period following 
World War II,8 the fall of Communism presented new 
challenges to Eastern and Central European countries 
regarding their minority policies: renewed tensions 
between ethnic groups were a serious threat to the 
stability of the entire region. Hungary managed to 
survive the political transition with a largely acclaimed 
new legal framework on the protection of national 
minorities.  
 
The four main levels of Hungary’s minority-related law 
are the following: the Fundamental Law of Hungary 
(before 2012: Constitution), the Nationalities Act of 
2011 (before that, the Minorities Act of 1993), sectoral 
laws (e.g. on elections, civil and criminal proceedings, 
public administration), and international treaties ratified 
by the State (most importantly, the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and 
the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages). 
 
Hungary’s former Constitution (Act No. XX of 1949) 
recognized minorities living in the country as constituent 
                                                 
7 See, e.g. JÁSZIM Oszkár: A Monarchia jövője. A dualizmus bukása 
és a dunai egyesült államok. Budapest, Maecenas, 1988 [1918]. 
SETON-WATSON, Robert: Racial Problems in Hungary. London, 
Archibald Constable and Co. Ltd., 1908. 
8 On the minority policy and legislation of the socialist period, see 
NAGY, Noémi: Nyelvi jog és nyelvpolitika Magyarországon az első 
világháború végétől napjainkig. Közelítések, 2015/3–4, 112–124. 
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components of the State and granted them the right to 
collective participation in public affairs, the fostering of 
their culture, the use of and education in their language, 
representation, and the right to self-government: 
 
Art. 68 (1) The national and ethnic 
minorities living in the Republic of 
Hungary share the power of the people: 
they are constituent parts of the State.  
(2) The Republic of Hungary shall 
provide for the protection of national and 
ethnic minorities.9 It shall ensure their 
collective participation in public affairs, 
the fostering of their cultures, the use of 
their mother tongues, education in their 
mother tongues and the use of names in 
their own languages.  
(3) The laws of the Republic of Hungary 
shall ensure representation for the national 
and ethnic minorities living within the 
country.  
(4) National and ethnic minorities shall 
have the right to establish local and 
national self-governments. 
                                                 
9 The distinction between national and ethnic minorities was 
primarily based on whether a given minority had a kin state (that is, 
a country from which the people of the minority derive their origin) 
or not. In this sense, the Roma and Ruthenians were considered as 
ethnic minorities. KÁLLAI, Ernő – VARJÚ, Gabriella: A kisebbségi 
törvény. In: Gyulavári – Kállai 2010: 187. Naturally, this distinction 
has never been relevant in terms of the constitutional rights of 
minorities. 
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(5) A two-thirds majority of the votes of 
the Members of Parliament present is 
required to adopt the law on the rights of 
national and ethnic minorities.10 
 
Based on the Constitution, Act No. LXXVII of 1993 on 
the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities 
(hereinafter: Minorities Act) regulated individual and 
collective rights of minorities in great detail, including 
educational rights, the right to use their own language in 
various public and private spheres, and the right to self-
government. Whereas the language regime of the 
Minorities Act had hardly been criticized, serious 
problems had been raised in connection with the 
regulation and operation of the minority self-government 
system, thus the law was thoroughly amended in 2005 
and 2010.11  
 
                                                 
10 This text is the result of three modifications of the original 
constitutional text. Act No. XXXI of 1989 only contained the first 
two paragraphs of Article 68, using the term “national and linguistic 
minorities”. Act No. XL of 1990 introduced the term “ethnic” 
instead of “linguistic” minorities, and included two new paragraphs 
to regulate the representation of minorities as well as to lay down 
the condition for adopting a law on minority rights. Finally, Act No. 
LXIII of 1990 gave the right to minorities to establish their own 
self-governing bodies at the local and national levels. 
11 Act No. CXIV of 2005 on the Election of Minority Self-
Government Representatives and on the Amendment of Certain 
Laws on National and Ethnic Minorities; Act No. LXII of 2010 
Amending the Laws Necessary to Reduce the Number of Minority 
Self-Government Representatives. 
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The Minorities Act defined national or ethnic minorities 
as „any ethnic group with a history of at least one 
century of living in the Republic of Hungary, which 
represents a numerical minority among the citizens of 
the State, the members of which are Hungarian citizens, 
and are distinguished from the rest of the citizens by 
their own language, culture and traditions, and at the 
same time demonstrate a sense of belonging together, 
which is aimed at the preservation of all these, and the 
expression and protection of the interests of their 
communities, which have been formed in the course of 
history”.12 The Minorities Act also gave a taxative list of 
the 13 minorities living in the country: Armenians, 
Bulgarians, Croats, Germans, Greeks, Poles, the Roma, 
Romanians, Ruthenians, Serbs, Slovaks, Slovenes, and 
Ukrainians.13 
 
In 2011 a new Constitution and a new law on minorities 
were adopted by the Hungarian Parliament. The 
Fundamental Law of Hungary, which entered into force 
on 1 January 2012, declares Hungarian as the official 
language of the State, and re-introduces the traditional 
term “nationalities” instead of “minorities” (although 
with the same meaning). Nationalities and their 
languages are first mentioned in the preamble. With a bit 
unlucky phrasing, nationalities are declared to be State-
                                                 
12 Minorities Act, Article 1 (2). 
13 However, the list of recognized minorities is not closed once and 
for all: the law enables the stakeholders themselves to initiate their 
recognition as a national or ethnic minority by means of a special 
popular initiative. See, section 4 of this paper. 
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forming factors: „nationalities living with us form part 
of the Hungarian political community and are 
constituent parts of the State”. Since the preamble has 
been written in the name of „we the members of the 
Hungarian nation”, a strictly grammatical interpretation 
might suggest that members of the „nationalities living 
with us” are not part of the Hungarian people.14 
However, Article XXIX repeats this provision in a way 
that leaves no doubt about nationalities being State-
forming factors: “[n]ationalities living in Hungary shall 
be constituent parts of the State”. Article XXIX further 
provides that “[e]very Hungarian citizen belonging to 
any nationality shall have the right to freely express and 
preserve his or her identity. Nationalities living in 
Hungary shall have the right to use their native 
languages and to the individual and collective use of 
names in their own languages, to promote their own 
cultures, and to be educated in their native languages”. 
Nationalities also have the constitutional right to 
establish self-governments at the local and national 
levels, the detailed rules of which shall be defined by a 
cardinal act. Nationalities are mentioned in two other 
instances in the Fundamental Law: first, in relation to the 
Parliament’s work, calling for their participation as 
                                                 
14 This non-inclusive language was criticized by the Venice 
Commission, the advisory body of the Council of Europe on 
constitutional matters: Opinion no. 621/2011 on the new 
Constitution of Hungary, CDL-AD(2011)016. Strasbourg, 20 June 
2011, par. 40. Available at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile
=CDL-AD(2011)016-e (last accessed: 14 December 2019) 
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defined by a cardinal act,15 and second, in relation to the 
Commissioner of Fundamental Rights, one of whose 
deputies is entrusted with the protection of the rights of 
nationalities.16 
 
In accordance with the Fundamental Law, the new law 
on minorities (Act No. CLXXIX of 2011 on the Rights 
of Nationalities, hereinafter: Nationalities Act),17 which 
entered into force on 1 January 2012, clarified the rules 
on the legal status and operation of nationality self-
governments, taking into account many legislative 
proposals of the former Minority Ombudsman.18 
                                                 
15 „Nationalities living in Hungary shall contribute to Parliament’s 
work as defined by a cardinal Act.” Fundamental Law of Hungary, 
Article 2. 
16 Fundamental Law of Hungary, Article 30 (3). The deputy of the 
Commissioner of Fundamental Rights has replaced the former 
independent position of the Minority Ombudsman. For an 
assessment of constitutional changes relevant to minorities, see PAP, 
András László: Kisebbségi jogok (védelmének változásai) az új 
alkotmányban, Kisebbségkutatás, 2011/2. 190–206. 
17 The English text of the law is cited from: VENICE COMMISSION: 
Opinion no. 671/2012 on the Act on the Rights of Nationalities of 
Hungary, CDL-AD(2012)011. Strasbourg, 19 June 2012. Available 
at: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile
=CDL-AD(2012)011-e (last accessed: 14 December 2019) 
18 A Nemzeti és Etnikai Kisebbségek Országgyűlési Biztosának 
véleménye a készülő nemzetiségi törvény tervezetéről [Opinion of 
the Parliamentary Commissioner for National and Ethnic Minorities 
on the Draft Law on Nationalities], 15 November 2011. Available 
at: http://www.kisebbsegiombudsman.hu/hir-706-velemeny-
keszulo-nemzetisegi-torveny.html (last accessed: 14 December 
2019). 
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Innovations include, inter alia: elections of nationality 
self-governments are linked to census data; return of the 
transformed nationality self-government form at the 
local level; restoration of the legal institution of 
preferential nationality mandate; nationality self-
governments are now legal persons autonomously 
managing their finances; conditions provided for legal 
and financial control; obligation of cooperation between 
the local nationality self-government and the local 
government is strengthened with legal remedies; 
introduction of the collection of recommendations for 
candidates. Passive voting has been made subject to 
stricter conditions in the elections of nationality self-
governments: first, only Hungarian citizens belonging to 
the given nationality may stand as candidates in these 
elections, and second, candidates must formally declare 
that they did not stand as candidates for another 
nationality in the last two general elections of nationality 
self-governments. In addition, the Act on the Election of 
Members of Parliament (Act No. CCIII of 2011) further 
specified the institutions of preferential parliamentary 
mandate and parliamentary spokesperson. As regards 
linguistic provisions, these were taken from the earlier 
Minorities Act relatively unchanged. An important 
novelty is that the mandatory provision of certain 
language rights became bound to a certain ratio of the 
nationality population as established by census data. If 
that ratio is not reached, such rights may still be granted 
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by the local municipality at the request of organizations 
and persons belonging to the respective nationality.19  
 
The Venice Commission, which had been asked to 
comment on the Nationalities Act, was generally 
satisfied with the new regulation. According to the 
Commission, the new act – despite being particularly 
complex and at times excessively detailed and lacking 
legal clarity – „confirms Hungary’s internationally 
recognised commitment to minority protection”.20 
 
 
3. The Constitutional Court of Hungary in a 
nutshell 
 
In Hungary, the supreme guardian of rule of law, human 
rights, and most importantly for the purposes of this 
paper: minority rights, is the Constitutional Court. The 
institution is the product of the transition to democracy 
(just like in other post-soviet countries of the East-
                                                 
19 A 20% ratio is requested for the bilingual drafting of minutes and 
decisions of the board of representatives and for employing local 
officials familiar with the nationality language concerned; whereas 
10% is needed for decrees, declarations, announcements, and forms 
of local municipalities as well as place names, street signs and 
public inscriptions to be published in the languages of nationalities 
(in addition to Hungarian), and for local media service providers to 
broadcast regular nationality public service programs (Articles 5 and 
6). 
20 VENICE COMMISSION 2012, paras. 82–84. 
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Central European region):21 it was established in October 
1989 (by a new Article 32/A inserted into the 
Constitution and Act No. XXXII of 1989 on the 
Constitutional Court).22 On 23 November 1989 the 
Parliament elected the first five judges of the Court, 
which commenced its operation on 1 January 1990. Five 
additional members were selected by the new, freely 
elected Parliament in mid-1990. Since September 2011 
the Court has fifteen members. Competences of the 
Court include ex post and ex ante constitutional review 
of legal provisions, examination of legislative omissions, 
interpretation of the Constitution, constitutional 
complaints, and performing remedy in referendum 
cases.23  
 
The new constitution of Hungary and the new law on the 
Constitutional Court (Act No. CLI of 2011) introduced 
significant changes. For instance, whereas until 31 
December 2011 anyone could submit a petition 
                                                 
21 For a comparative overview and a thorough analysis of 
Constitutional Courts in the region, see SADURSKI, Wojciech: Rights 
Before Courts. A Study of Constitutional Courts in Postcommunist 
States of Central and Eastern Europe. Dordrecht – Heidelberg – 
New York – London, Springer, 2014. 
22 For the establishment and early operation of the Constitutional 
Court of Hungary, see SÓLYOM, László: The Role of Constitutional 
Courts in the Transition to Democracy with Special Reference to 
Hungary. International Sociology, 2003/1, 133–161. SCHEPPELE, 
Kim Lane: Guardians of the constitution: Constitutional court 
presidents and the struggle for the rule of law in post-Soviet Europe. 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2006/154, 1757–1851. 
23 Brief history of the Constitutional Court of Hungary. Available at: 
https://hunconcourt.hu/history/ (last accessed: 14 December 2019) 
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requesting the posterior constitutional review of a legal 
norm, according to the new rules such a proceeding can 
be initiated only by the Government, one-quarter of the 
Members of Parliament, the Commissioner for 
Fundamental Rights, the president of the Curia (the 
Supreme Court’s new name since 2012) and the General 
Prosecutor. Furthermore, there are now three types of 
constitutional complaints: the original one, submitted by 
a person or organisation affected by a concrete case if 
their fundamental rights were violated by the application 
of an unconstitutional law and there is no other legal 
remedy available; when rights were violated directly, 
without a judicial decision, and there is no procedure for 
legal remedy designed to repair the violation; and against 
a judicial decision that was contrary to the Fundamental 
Law if the decision violated fundamental rights. 
 
Critical voices regarding the operation of the 
Constitutional Court have intensified following the 
changes in legislation after 2011, concerning inter 
aliathe increase in the numbers of the judges, the 
introduction of restrictions on the body’s powers, and the 
incorporation of mandatory constitutional interpretation 
criteria into the Fundamental Law.24 Some authors speak 
                                                 
24 For more information on this, see TILK, Péter – NASZLADI, 
Georgina: Az Alkotmánybíróságra vonatkozó szabályozás 
átalakulása 2010 után. In: Gárdos-Orosz Fruzsina – Szente Zoltán 
(eds.): Jog és politika határán: Alkotmánybíráskodás 
Magyarországon 2010 után. Budapest, HVG-Orac Lap- és 
Könyvkiadó Kft., 2015. 41–74. HUNGARIAN HELSINKI COMMITTEE: 
Attacking the Last Line of Defence. Judicial Independence in 
Hungary in Jeopardy. 15 June 2018. Available online: 
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of party-line constitutional justice,25 the twilight of 
constitutionality,26 or the loss of the constitutional role of 
the Constitutional Court.27 In fact, on the basis of the 
review of the relevant case law, the Constitutional 
Court’s approach towards minority rights appear to has 
been unaffected by the above developments (unless we 
consider a further decline in the numbers of minority-
related cases as such): there has been little emphasis on 
the protection of minority rights in the Court’s practice, 
both before and after 2011. 
 
 
4. What is a minority? 
 
Although the answers to the questions: What is a 
Minority? and Who is a minority? are obviously 
interrelated, there is a good reason to treat the two topics 
separately. Indeed, as Majtényi and Pap pointed out, 
„while the State needs to identify persons belonging to 
minorities in order to ensure the special rights of 
minorities for them, it does not necessarily have to 
                                                                                             
https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/Attacking-the-Last-
Line-of-Defense-June2018.pdf (last accessed: 14 December 2019) 
25 HALMAI, Gábor: In memoriam magyar alkotmánybíráskodás – a 
pártos Alkotmánybíróság első éve. Fundamentum, 2014/1–2. 36–64. 
26 HANÁK, András: Sötétség délben: az alkotmányosság alkonya 
Magyarországon. Fundamentum, 2013/1. 63–75. 
27 MAJTÉNYI, Balázs: Alkotmányos értékek játszmája. 
Fundamentum, 2017/1–2, 41. 
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endeavour to define the concept of minority.”28 In fact, 
neither did the Constitution, nor does the Fundamental 
Law contain a definition of the term “minorities” or 
“nationalities”, it is merely stipulated that they are 
“constituent parts of the State”. As several authors argue, 
the term has not yet been given a clear meaning, despite 
a number of interpretative rulings by the Constitutional 
Court.29  
 
The first case in which the Constitutional Court touched 
upon the concept of minorities dates back to 1992. The 
Constitutional Court’s Decision no. 35/1992. (VI. 10.) of 
2 June 1992 addressed a petition concerning the 
representation of minorities, and stated the following: 
„The assertion of the Constitution that recognizes 
national and ethnic minorities as constituent parts of the 
State makes the statutory regulation of the rights of 
minorities extremely important. Among and in addition 
to these rights, the Constitution specifically mentions the 
representation of national and ethnic minorities. 
Representation is a necessary prerequisite for national 
and ethnic minorities to fulfil their role as constituent 
parts of the State”.30 And since, up to then, „the general 
representation of minorities has not been statutorily 
                                                 
28 MAJTÉNYI, Balázs – PAP, András László: Végtelen történet: a 
kisebbségi hovatartozásról, Fundamentum, 2006/2. 100. 
29 Cf. e.g. PAP, András László: Sarkalatos átalakulások – a 
nemzetiségekre vonatkozó szabályozás, MTA Law Working Papers, 
2014/52. 4–5. Available at: 
https://jog.tk.mta.hu/uploads/files/mtalwp/2014_52_Pap.pdf (last 
accessed: 14 December 2019) 
30 Decision no. 35/1992. (VI. 10.) of 2 June 1992, III. par. 1. 
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ensured to the extent and in the manner prescribed by 
the Constitution”,31 the Court found a legislative 
omission violating the Constitution. In short, we learnt 
from this decision that the role of minorities as 
constituent elements of the State makes minority rights 
so important that they need to be regulated in the second 
highest form of law in the Hungarian legal system (with 
the Constitution on top of the domestic legal hierarchy), 
that is an act adopted by the Parliament. Furthermore, we 
also learnt that representation is a sine qua non for 
minorities to fulfil their role as State-forming factors. All 
of this was repeated verbatim in Order no. 24/1994 (V. 
6.) (2 May 1994) of the Constitutional Court (II. par. 6.). 
 
According to the (former) Parliamentary Commissioner 
for National and Ethnic Minorities, the fact that the exact 
content of the legal status of “constituent part of the 
State” is not legally defined is problematic because thus 
it is not possible to determine what specific rights can be 
deduced from the constitutional provision and what 
legislative tasks are required to ensure this special status 
for minorities. The Constitutional Court, in its Order no. 
1041/G/1999 of 5 September 2000, rejected the 
Commissioner’s petition without considering it on the 
merits, referring to the lack of its own competence. The 
Court justified its decision by the fact that the petition 
basically established general requirements for 
legislation, it did not present a specific constitutional 
problem, and therefore did not meet the requirements of 
                                                 
31 Ibid., III., par. 3. 
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an abstract interpretation of the Constitution with erga 
omnes effect, which requirements – in light of the 
Constitutional Court’s standing practice – must be 
interpreted strictly. 
 
If not the Constitution, the Minorities Act did contain a 
definition of minorities which the subsequent 
Nationalities Act retained almost in identical form 
(except the requirement of citizenship).32 According to 
the current regulation, „all ethnic groups resident in 
Hungary for at least one century are nationalities which 
are in numerical minority amongst the population of the 
State, are distinguished from the rest of the population 
by their own language, culture and traditions, and 
manifest a sense of cohesion that is aimed at the 
preservation of these and at the expression and 
protection of the interests of their historically 
established communities”.33 The annex to the law 
contains a list of the 13 ethnic groups that are currently 
recognised as nationalities, but this list is not closed 
because those concerned are allowed to initiate their 
recognition as a minority. Under the former Minorities 
Act, in order to prove that an ethnic group met the 
conditions set out in the legal definition of a minority, a 
special popular initiative had to be launched by at least 1 
000 persons (as opposed to the general rule of popular 
initiatives requiring at least 50 000 valid signatures). 
                                                 
32 Under the 1993 Minorities Act only citizens of Hungary were 
entitled to minority rights. For further details, see Section 5 of this 
paper. 
33 Nationalities Act, Article 1. 
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Procedural issues were governed by the provisions of 
Act No. III of 1998 on National Referendums and 
Popular Initiatives, with the – later incorporated – 
additional prescription that during its proceedings the 
National Election Commission (NEC) shall request the 
statement of the President of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences on whether the legal conditions had been met.34 
The possibility of recognizing an additional minority 
group is also provided for in the new Nationalities Act,35 
although Act No. CCXXXVIII of 2013 abolished the 
institution of popular initiative. 
 
Four cases related to such popular initiatives have been 
brought before the Constitutional Court: those of the 
Jews and the Russians in 2006, that of the Bunjevacs in 
2010, and that of the Huns in 2012.36 In the first three 
cases, individuals filed objections to the decision of the 
NEC approving the requested popular initiative. The 
objection that served as a basis for the Constitutional 
Court’s Decision no. 2/2006 (I. 30.) of 30 January 2006 
                                                 
34 Minorities Act, Article 61 (2). 
35 Nationalities Act, Article 148, paras. (3)–(6). The previous 
institution of special popular initiative is now called „initiative for 
the recognition of a nationality group as being traditionally resident 
in Hungary”. 
36 (Popular) initiatives have been also launched in order to recognize 
the Aegean Macedonians and the Szeklers, but these were rejected 
by the NEC and therefore never reached the Constitutional Court. 
See, Decisions no. 1/2001. (V.7.) and no. 996/2019. of the National 
Election Commission. Available online (in Hungarian language): 
https://www.valasztas.hu/hatarozat-megjelenito/ (last accessed: 14 
December 2019) 
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was filed against the NEC’s decision authenticating the 
signature sheet for the recognition of the Jewish 
minority. The petitioners regarded the authentication 
unlawful because they considered that the legal 
conditions for recognising Jews as a minority were not 
met, and thus the initiative itself was contrary to the 
definition of national and ethnic minority as stipulated in 
the Minorities Act. The Constitutional Court stated that, 
like all popular initiatives, this one also had as its 
purpose to put the issue on the agenda of the Parliament 
– the organ which had the actual competence to decide 
about the approval or rejection of popular initiatives. 
According to the Court, the institution of popular 
initiative as regulated by the Minorities Act aims at a 
specific purpose: to amend the provision of the 
Minorities Act enlisting recognised minority groups, 
thereby to recognise an ethnic group as a national or 
ethnic minority; however, the initiative itself does not 
bind the Parliament. Therefore, the assessment of 
whether the “testimony” made by the signatories meets 
the requirements of the Minorities Act belongs to the 
competence of Parliament. Consequently, the 
Constitutional Court upheld the decision of the NEC and 
did not undertake to pronounce itself on the content of 
the statutory conditions for being a minority, and even 
less on the fulfilment of these conditions in the present 
case.37 
                                                 
37 In turn, Justice Péter Kovács, in his extensive dissenting opinion, 
devoted particular attention to the concept of minority, including 




By the time of the Constitutional Court’s Decision no. 
27/2006 (VI. 21) of 19 June 2006 on the recognition of 
the Russians in Hungary, the amendment to the 
Minorities Act had already been in force, pursuant to 
which the National Election Commission was obliged to 
seek the opinion of the President of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences on compliance with the statutory 
minority criteria. According to the petitioner, the body 
acted unlawfully in approving the popular initiative 
because it did not comply with this new condition. 
However, the Constitutional Court pointed out that 
although the amended law requires the NEC to obtain 
the opinion of the President of the Academy, it does not 
specify when to do so during its proceedings: it may do 
so before or after authenticating the signature sheets, 
since – as Decision no. 2/2006. (I. 30.) previously 
underlined – the determination of whether a given 
minority group meets the legal requirements falls within 
the competence of the Parliament (regardless of the 
opinion obtained). Thus, the NEC’s obligation is merely 
to submit the initiative to the Parliament together with 
the opinion of the President of the Academy.  
 
Decision no. 148/2010 (VII. 14.) (13 July 2010) of the 
Constitutional Court practically repeated the same line of 
reasoning about the NEC’s purely technical role when 
upheld the decision on the popular initiative for the 
recognition of the Bunjevacs. In turn, the Constitutional 
                                                                                             
the Constitutional Court and of the question of recognition as a 
minority in general, see MAJTÉNYI – PAP 2006: 100–103. 
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Court in its Decision no. 3265/2012. (X. 4.) of 24 
September 2012 rejected, for formal reasons, a 
constitutional complaint seeking the annulment of the 
parliamentary resolution refusing to recognize the Huns 
and the provision of the Nationality Act, which, 
according to the petitioners, did not guarantee the 
recognition of the Huns as a nationality, thereby 
violating their right to identity. Since the complaint was 
rejected without examining it on the merits, we remained 
in the dark in terms of how the Constitutional Court 
opines about the constitutional criteria for the definition 
of “minorities”. 
 
In the case resulting in Decision no. 1162/D/2010 of 13 
December 2011, the petitioner brought a constitutional 
complaint to the Constitutional Court. In the impugned 
order, the Central District Court of Pest rejected the 
petitioner’s objection claiming that the local electoral 
office had refused to include him as belonging to the 
“Hungarian minority” in the register of minority voters. 
The petitioner requested the annulment of the provision 
of the Minorities Act defining the term “national and 
ethnic minority”, because the definition, in his opinion, 
discriminated against persons who are not in numerical 
minority and did not specify what (how many) is to be 
understood under “numerical minority”. The petition, in 
its absurdity, offered the Constitutional Court a great 
opportunity to elaborate on the concept of minority, but 
the judges remained reluctant to do so. The Court stated 
only that the Minorities Act defined the concept of 
minority as opposed to the ethnic group with Hungarian 
citizenship and nationality, constituting the majority 
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state-forming factor. It rejected the claim of 
discrimination on the basis of its previous case-law, 
according to which the Constitution prohibits unjustified 
discrimination only between right-holders within the 
same regulatory scope, however, in the present case the 
affected persons did not belong to the same group in 
terms of the regulation (majority vs. minority).38 The 
second allegation about the precise numerical nature of a 
minority was summarily rejected by the Constitutional 
Court for the following reason: a constitutional 
complaint can only be filed in the event of a violation of 
a fundamental constitutional right, however, the 
provision referred to by the petitioner, i.e. „the 
requirement of legal certainty as part of the rule of law 
                                                 
38 The Constitutional Court applies two measures on discrimination 
and the restriction of (fundamental) constitutional rights: the stricter 
„necessity–proportionality test” in case of fundamental rights, and 
the simpler „reasonableness test” in case of rights which are not 
considered as fundamental. Based on the latter test, the Court has to 
ascertain only whether the classification of persons can be justified 
by objective reasons. (This test was applied in the case of the 
„Hungarian minority”.) According to the necessity–proportionality 
test, a restriction of a fundamental right is constitutional when it is 
indispensable, that is, if the protection or enforcement of another 
fundamental right or freedom or the protection of other 
constitutional values cannot be achieved in any other way. In 
addition, the importance of the objective pursued and the severity of 
the violation of the fundamental right caused by it must be in 
proportion. When restricting a right, the legislator shall choose the 
least severe means to achieve the given objective. HALMAI, Gábor – 
TÓTH, Gábor Attila (eds.): Emberi jogok [Human Rights]. Budapest, 
Osiris, 2003. 390–391. See also Decision no. 30/1992. (V. 26.) of 18 
May 1992; Decision no. 1006/B/2001. of 4 December 2007, III. 4.1. 
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does not in itself qualify as a citizens’ right guaranteed 
by the Constitution”.39 
 
The issue of definition of minorities has since been 
raised only marginally. Decision no. 6/2013. (III. 1.) of 
26 February 2013 dealt with church rights, where the 
Court pointed out “the fundamentally different status” of 
churches as opposed to nationalities, the latter being 
“constituent parts of the State, elements of the 
Hungarian political community”, and thus they “may 
have a special treatment as regards their participation in 
the work of the Parliament”, as well.40 Accordingly, the 
status of constituent parts of the State requires “special 
treatment”, but the exact nature of this and the outlines 
of the resulting rights were not revealed by the 
Constitutional Court. 
 
To conclude, the Constitutional Court – in its majority 
decisions –has failed to interpret the concept of 
minority.41 Instead, the body would conveniently refer to 
                                                 
39 Decision no. 1162/D/2010, III. 4., referring to a former decision 
of the Constitutional Court.  
40 Decision no. 6/2013, par. 206. 
41 In turn, Justice András Bragyova’s concurring opinion attached to 
Decision no. 45/2005. (XII. 14.) (12 December 2005) contains 
valuable statements: „Ethnic and national minorities are cultural 
and political communities within the Hungarian political 
community; this is expressed in Article 68 (1) of the Constitution 
when referring to national and ethnic minorities as „constituent 
elements of the State”. Minorities form a special social group that is 
differentiated from the majority by their national–ethnic identity 
and, based on this, their cultural identity. Recognition as 
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the definition of the Minorities Act, often slipping into 
circular reasoning. One may come across with such 
“slips of the tongue” in the decisions of the 
Constitutional Court as the following one: „The concept 
of minority and that of persons belonging to a minority 
are defined in the Minorities Act. The fact that »there is 
no public record of who are considered as belonging to 
minorities« does not make the concept of persons 
belonging to a minority incomprehensible or obscure.” 
42 This already takes us to our next subject. 
 
 
5. Who belongs to a minority? 
 
Who can exercise minority rights guaranteed under the 
Constitution and other legislation? The answer at first 
glance seems obvious: persons belonging to minorities, 
of course. However, who belongs to a minority cannot 
be ascertained just as easily. In fact, the most 
problematic part of Hungary’s law on minorities is the 
indeterminacy of the subjects of minority rights.43 
Therefore, it is extremely important to review the 
                                                                                             
„constituent elements of the State” entails the recognition that 
minorities must be treated on an equal basis with the majority: the 
constituent factor cannot have less rights than individuals belonging 
to the majority nation.” (Justice Bragyova’s concurring opinion, 1. 
par. 1.) 
42 Decision no. 713/B/2006, III. 
43 MAJTÉNYI – PAP 2006: 103. 
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Constitutional Court’s interpretative work of the relevant 
law. 
 
Pursuant to the current provisions of the Nationalities 
Act, for the purposes of the rights and obligations of 
nationalities, a person forms part of a nationality who 
„resides in Hungary, regards himself as part of a 
nationality and declares his affiliation with that 
nationality in the cases and manner determined in this 
Act”.44 Self-identifying with a minority and declaring 
this fact is the exclusive and inalienable right of the 
individual; thus, as a general rule, no person may be 
required to declare his or her affiliation with a 
minority.45 This principle is underlined by Article 3(1) of 
the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities (a Council of Europe treaty to which 
Hungary is a party since its entry into force, that is 
1998): „Every person belonging to a national minority 
shall have the right freely to choose to be treated or not 
to be treated as such and no disadvantage shall result 
                                                 
44 Nationalities Act of 2011, Article 1 (2). Under the previous 
legislation (cf. Art. 1(1) of the 1993 Minorities Act), only Hungarian 
citizens could be right-holders. Since 2014, the scope of the 
Nationalities Act has been extended to foreign nationals residing in 
Hungary, and a case of this sort was in fact brought before the 
Constitutional Court in 2016, related to the right to use one’s own 
language in court proceedings (see Order no. 3192/2016. [X. 4.] of 
27 September 2016). The provision in question entered into force on 
the day of general elections called for nationality self-goverments, 
i.e. on July 29, 2014. Cf., Decision no. 1128/2014. (VIII. 5.) of the 
National Election Commission. 
45 Minorities Act, Article 7; Nationalities Act, Article 11. 
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from this choice or from the exercise of the rights which 
are connected to that choice”.46 In fact, the Advisory 
Committee on the Framework Convention in its fourth 
thematic commentary has considered the right to free 
self-identification a “cornerstone of minority rights”.47 
As Hungary’s legislation also relies on the free choice of 
identity in relation to the exercise of minority rights, the 
Constitutional Court’s practice is similarly based on this 
principle. The Court has interpreted minority affiliation 
as closely related to the right to self-determination and 
self-identification, and ultimately to the right to human 
dignity.48 
 
                                                 
46 COUNCIL OF EUROPE, ETS No. 157. Available at: 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/minorities/text-of-the-convention (last 
accessed: 14 December 2019) 
47 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR 
THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES: The Framework 
Convention: a key tool to managing diversity through minority 
rights – The Scope of Application of the Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities. Thematic Commentary No. 4. 
Strasbourg, 27 May 2016. p. 7. For more information on this, see 
CRAIG, Elizabeth: Who Are The Minorities? The Role of the Right 
to Self-Identify within the European Minority Rights Framework. 
Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 2016/2., 6–
30. 
48 For monographic discussion of this issue (in Hungarian language), 
see PAP, András László: Identitás és reprezentáció – Az etnikai 
hovatartozás meghatározásától a politikai képviseletig. Budapest, 
MTA Kisebbségkutató Intézet – Gondolat Kiadó, 2007. See also the 
more recent book edited by Halász Iván – Majtényi Balázs (eds.): 
Regisztrálható-e az identitás? Az identitásválasztás szabadsága és a 
nemzeti hovatartozás nyilvántartása. Budapest, Gondolat Kiadó – 
MTA Jogtudományi Intézet, 2013.  
 63
Hungary’s pre-2005 regulation on minorities was 
severely criticized for the fact that in the absence of 
formal identification or registration anyone could 
participate in the elections of minority self-governments: 
that is, not only persons belonging to the given minority 
who considered themselves as such, but practically 
anyone could vote and be elected.49 Of course, 
identifying those people who belong to minorities is 
important not only for the purposes of the right to vote 
but for the exercise of other minority rights, too. The 
Constitutional Court itself has acknowledged as much in 
its Decision No. 58/2001. (XII. 7.) (3 December 2001) 
related to the right to use one’s name in their own 
language: „it may give rise to abuses […] that minorities 
do not have to verify their nationality affiliation”.50 
 
In fact, most of the known malpractice have occurred in 
the context of elections. During the 2002–2003 elections 
there have been so many abuses in relation to all 
minority groups that the Constitutional Court was 
eventually requested to interpret the relevant provisions 
of the Constitution and declare that only citizens who 
consider themselves as members of a minority have the 
right to participate in the minority self-government 
                                                 
49 For more information on the “cuckoo phenomenon” 
(ethnobusiness), see LATORCAI, Csaba: A nemzetiséghez tartozók 
önkormányzáshoz fűződő jogai az Alaptörvény és a nemzetiségi 
törvény tükrében. Rövid történeti áttekintés 1993-tól. A 
„kakukktojás” jelenség, Kisebbségkutatás, 2014/1., 30–51. 
50 Decision no. 58/2001. (XII. 7.) of 3 December 2001, IV.2.6. par. 
9. 
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elections. The Court rejected the petition because the 
petitioners were not legally entitled to request a 
constitutional interpretation (Order no. 181/E/1998 of 16 
February 2004). However, the judges could not avoid 
examining the issue on the merits when the Minority 
Ombudsman asked the very same question (Decision no. 
45/2005 (XII. 14.) of 12 December 2005). 
 
Shortly after the submission of the Ombudsman’s 
petition, the Parliament adopted Act No. CXIV of 2005 
on the Election of Minority Self-Government 
Representatives and the Amendment of Certain Acts 
concerning National and Ethnic Minorities, which 
introduced the institution of minority registration. 
However, even against this background, the Ombudsman 
considered the situation unconstitutional and filed 
another petition with the Constitutional Court. In his 
view, the new law failed to guarantee the truthfulness of 
declarations on national or ethnic minority affiliation, 
nor did it provide for sanctions in case of false 
declarations. Therefore, he maintained his request for a 
constitutional interpretation to clarify whether, in order 
to enforce the right of minorities to self-government, 
making voters declare their minority affiliation during 
electoral proceedings can be regarded as constituting a 
lawful restriction on their right to the protection of 
personal data, and whether the State could verify, within 
limits set by the law, the genuineness of these 
declarations. He further requested that the new legal 
rules be annulled and that the Parliament be called upon 
to adopt appropriate provisions. 
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According to thereasoning of the Constitutional Court, 
the decision on minority self-identification and the 
communication thereofto others fall within the scope of 
the right to identity and self-determination derived from 
human dignity (just like the right to one’s own name51). 
The right to self-determination also includes the 
possibility of not revealing someone’s affiliation with a 
minority group. This is where the right to privacy and 
the protection of personal data are linked to self-
determination.52 Use and disclosure of personal data 
related to minority affiliation is, in fact, subject to the 
consent of the individual, on the basis of the right to 
informational self-determination.53 However, within the 
limits set by the Constitution, this right may be 
restricted: by law, in accordance with the requirements 
of the necessity–proportionality test.54 Thus, the 
Constitutional Court considered it constitutionally 
permissible that individuals be obliged to declare their 
affiliation with a minority group, if this restriction is 
justified by compelling reasons in the protection of other 
constitutional rights and values, and if the least possible 
                                                 
51 Cf. Decision no. 58/2001. (XII. 7.) of 3 December 2001. 
52 Decision no. 45/2005. (XII. 14.) of 12 December 2005, III. 5., 
paras. 2–3. 
53 For more information on the right of informational self-
determination in the practice of the Consitutional Court of Hungary, 
see POLGÁR, Miklós: The development of data protection and 
privacy policy in the light of practice of the Curia and of the 
Constitutional Court of Hungary. Pro Publico Bono – Public 
Administration, 2017/Special Edition 3, 110–121. 
54 See supra note 38. 
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amount of restriction is used, along with the most 
appropriate means.55 
 
The decision of the Court established that the 
Constitution regulates the right of national and ethnic 
minorities to participate in public life and to 
representation as a fundamental right, a form of which is 
the right to establish local and national self-
governments.56 The right to establish minority self-
governments can be the basis for some sort of restriction 
of the right to self-determination in connection with the 
declaration of minority affiliation. Making false 
declarations about minority affiliation on a mass scale 
may indeed interfere with the establishment of minority 
self-governments, and in order to prevent the 
development of such practices (i.e. ethnobusiness) 
appropriate legislation may be required. However, the 
Constitutional Court also stated that no single solution 
follows from the Constitution. Through constitutional 
interpretation it is not possible to determine what 
restriction of the right to informational self-
determination can be accepted as constitutional in order 
to confirm the authenticity of declarations about national 
and ethnic minority affiliation; it is not possible to 
decide on what basis, by whom and in what procedure 
may the verification take place. It is for the legislator to 
regulate this, and the legislator’s task cannot be taken 
over by the Constitutional Court when interpreting the 
                                                 
55 Decision no. 45/2005. (XII. 14.) of 12 December 2005, III. 5. 
paras. 4–6. 
56 Ibid., III. 9. 
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Constitution, since „only through the examination of a 
specific rule adopted by the legislator can be determined 
whether a given restriction is constitutional”.57 
 
Nor did the Constitutional Court establish a legislative 
omission in breach of the Constitution, although the 
Minority Ombudsman complained about the lack of 
legal provisions for verifying the declarations of 
minority affiliation and for sanctioning false 
declarations. While the Constitutional Court 
acknowledged that the lack of rules outlined in the 
petition may indeed be a source of abuses in practice, it 
also emphasized that filling the regulatory void would, in 
turn, entail a restriction of the right to human dignity 
(identity, self-determination) and of the right to 
informational self-determination. As it is, the 
Constitutional Court cannot oblige the legislator to adopt 
specific legislation entailing restriction of fundamental 
rights.58 
 
I must agree with Majtényi and Pap in that the majority 
decision, „while making some important statements, has 
refrained, by laconic formalism, from engaging in 
theoretical discussions beyond what was minimally 
necessary”.59 Instead of examining in depth the 
relationship between the right to establish minority self-
governments vs. the freedom of self-identification, the 
Court was satisfied with asserting that the Constitution 
                                                 
57 Ibid., III. 5. par. 7. 
58 Ibid., IV. 2. par. 7. 
59 MAJTÉNYI – PAP 2006: 95. 
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does not specify the precise content of these rights or the 
rules governing the exercise thereof.60 
 
At about the same time when the above case took place, 
in the midst of the revision of the legal framework on 
minorities, individuals filed a constitutional complaint, 
to which the Commissioner for Minorities eventually 
joined, requesting the Constitutional Court to declare 
that the law underlying an unlawful decision was 
unconstitutional. In view of the petitioners, during the 
interim elections held in the settlement of Csabaszabadi, 
the Slovakian representatives of the municipal 
government obtained their mandates unconstitutionally, 
because the electoral laws in force at that time did not 
require the minority candidate to actually belong to the 
community they were to represent. In this case, 
according to the Commissioner for Minorities, the 
minority representatives lacked the legitimacy from the 
members of the minority community represented. It 
logically follows from this that the subsequent 
transformation of the municipal government into a 
Slovak minority self-government was also 
unconstitutional. By Order no. 261/D/2005 of 21 
February 2006, the Constitutional Court rejected the 
petitions on formal grounds, without considering them 
                                                 
60 However, Justice András Bragyova’s and Justice Péter Kovács’s 
thoughts expressed in their concurring opinions are very valuable 
concerning the definition of the subjects (and the content) of 
minority rights. For a summary of these, see ENYEDI, Krisztián: Az 
Alkotmánybíróság legutóbbi döntéseiből, Fundamentum, 2006/1. 
145., and MAJTÉNYI – PAP 2006: 96–98. 
 69
on the merits. Pursuant to the majority decision, the 
result of the local interim election and the decision on 
the establishment of the local minority self-government 
cannot be considered as decisions made in a concrete 
case, whereas a constitutional complaint may only be 
submitted when rights are violated due to the application 
of a law in a concrete case.61 The reasoning of the 
majority decision did not meet Justice Elemér Balogh’s 
endorsement: in his concurring opinion, he considered 
the decision determining the outcome of the interim 
municipal elections very much as a decision made in a 
concrete case, one that was also subject to appeal under 
the then applicable legal provisions. Justice Péter 
Kovács, in his dissenting opinion, expressed his 
disapproval because of the lack of substantive 
examination of the petitioners’ concerns related to the 
enforceability of minority rights at the local level. He 
referred to the Constitutional Court’s established 
principle pursuant to which it is not the title of a legal act 
but the legal nature of its provisions that is relevant when 
determining the Court’s competence. 
 
Decision no. 168/B/2006. of 18 December 2007, dealing 
with minority self-governments, re-visited the institution 
of minority registration. The petitioners, unlike previous 
submissions and the Minority Ombudsman, considered 
unconstitutional the provision of the amended Minorities 
Act pursuant to which only those people can vote at the 
election of minority self-governments who identify 
                                                 
61 Order no. 261/D/2005. of 21 February 2006, III. 2. 
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themselves with a minority group and declare their 
minority affiliation by registering themselves on the 
minority electoral roll. The petitioners held this 
provision discriminatory and unconstitutional for 
violating the right to freedom of expression and the right 
to secrecy of correspondence, and for restricting the 
essential content of fundamental rights.62 In the opinion 
of the Constitutional Court, non-compliance with the 
freedom of expression cannot be established because it is 
the individual’s own free and autonomous choice to self-
identify with a minority group, and if they wish to 
participate in the election of minority representatives, 
they have to proclaim this choice in order to exercise 
their electoral rights. Furthermore, the institution of the 
minority electoral roll is regulated by law, and 
registering on it is at the discretion of the persons 
concerned, which does not result in the restriction of the 
essential content of a fundamental right. On the contrary, 
the minority electoral roll is a constitutional procedural 
guarantee for the exercise of another important (political) 
fundamental right: the right to vote.63 As for the 
violation of the secrecy of correspondence, the petitioner 
is mistaken because the list of minority voters is not 
public: it can be accessed only by those concerned and 
by certain persons determined by law, and it must be 
destroyed immediately after the results of the election 
become final.64  
 
                                                 
62 Decision no. 168/B/2006. of 18 December 2007, III. 3. paras. 1–2. 
63 Ibid., III. 3. par. 4. 
64 Ibid., III. 3. par. 5. 
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Furthermore, the submission considered as a case of 
unconstitutional discrimination that while Hungarian 
citizens do not have to declare their citizenship in order 
to be included in the (general) electoral roll, those who 
want to be registered on the list of minority voters have 
to explicitly state that they are members of a given 
minority community. However, the Constitutional Court 
pointed out that the right-holders in question do not 
belong to the same group in terms of the regulation, and 
thus there can be no discrimination between them.65 The 
Court explained that the reason why one does not have to 
declare his or her Hungarian citizenship in order to be 
registered on the electoral roll at the elections of 
representatives of local self-governments and members 
of parliament is that there exists an authentic register of 
Hungarian citizens having the right to vote. Members of 
national and ethnic minorities can by all means 
participate in the general elections, and when doing so 
they are not obliged to declare their Hungarian 
citizenship, either. However, the election of minority 
self-governments is a right for only those persons who 
belong to national and ethnic minorities – in turn, there 
is no official register about them. The purpose of 
minority registration is precisely to protect the exercise 
of electoral rights of minorities.66 The stricter regulation 
of the nomination process – only non-governmental 
organizations that have been in existence for at least 
three years may now nominate a minority candidate – 
also serves the representation of minorities. In this 
                                                 
65 See supra note 38 on the application of the reasonableness test. 
66 Decision no. 168/B/2006., III. 3. par. 6. 
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respect, the distinction between political parties and civil 
organizations is not arbitrary or unreasonable, as the 
group of right-holders at minority elections is likewise 
different.67 
 
Thus, the Constitutional Court reaffirmed its position 
expressed two years earlier that the institution of 
minority electoral roll is not unconstitutional in itself, on 
the contrary, it is a guarantee of the fundamental right of 
minorities to self-government: „The [institution of] 
minority electoral roll is based on the right of minorities 
to self-determination; registration on it is based on the 
voluntary, free choice of individuals belonging to a given 
minority; the list is not public, and it is a condition for 
holding minority self-government elections. The 
electoral roll is one option to realize the right of 
minorities to establish their self-governments as 
provided for by Article 68 (4) of the Constitution; the 
minority electoral roll is a guarantee thereof.”68 
 
The issue of the constitutionality of minority registration 
was raised in a new context after the adoption of the 
Nationalities Act of 2011. Pursuant to the new 
provisions, certain minority rights – related to language 
use and elections – may be exercised only if a specific 
number or proportion of persons belonging to a given 
nationality group is reached, according to the data of the 
latest census.69 For instance, elections of local minority 
                                                 
67 Ibid., III. 6. 
68 Ibid., III. 7. 
69 Nationalities Act, Articles 5(5), 6 and 56. 
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self-governments can be held only in settlements where 
there are at least 30 (before the 2024 elections: 25) 
people belonging to a given nationality.70 The regulation 
has raised many problems, which the Minority 
Ombudsman had already pointed out at the time of the 
drafting of the new law,71 and subsequently presented to 
the Constitutional Court in his petition for posterior 
constitutional review. The Ombudsman complained 
about, inter alia, that census data „cannot be regarded as 
an accurate representation of the nationality population 
of a settlement, as they are based on voluntary 
declarations of sensitive data”. In addition, it is of 
serious concern that at the time of the data collection of 
the latest census it was not known what consequences 
would the declaration of minority affiliation have for the 
exercise of minority rights.72  
 
For its Decision no. 41/2012. (XII. 6.) of 4 December 
2012, the Constitutional Court thoroughly studied 
Hungary’s relevant international obligations, since the 
Ombudsman also alleged that several provisions of the 
Nationalities Act are incompatible with international 
treaties ratified by the State. The Court noted that the 
Hungarian authorities, when implementing the European 
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
                                                 
70 Nationalities Act, Articles 56 and 242 (2). 
71 Supra note 17. 
72 The latest census was held on 1 October 2011, while the draft law 
on nationalities was sent to the Minority Ombudsman for 
consultation on 13 November 2011. 
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Minorities, have been repeatedly confronted with a basic 
problem due to „the lack of a credible dataset on 
ethnic/linguistic minorities, reservations about the 
feasibility of preparing [such a dataset], internal 
contradictions within the data collected at consecutive 
censuses, and the difficulty of reconciling the statistics of 
the Government with the estimates of the minorities, 
each using different techniques”73 This has also been 
noted by the monitoring bodies of the above treaties, 
who have repeatedly called on the Hungarian 
government „to display a more open attitude towards 
[the idea of] creating a register respecting the protection 
of personal data, based on reliable data, and reflecting 
the composition of linguistic minorities in individual 
settlements”.74 The monitoring documents of the 
Language Charter and the Framework Convention have 
also consistently emphasized that „the freedom of self-
identification does not exclude the production and use of 
statistical datasets on nationalities in order to fulfil the 
commitments made”.75 What is more, the official 
commentary on the Framework Convention also clearly 
states that the right to free self-identification (Article 3, 
par. 1) „does not imply a right for an individual to 
choose arbitrarily to belong to any national minority. 
The individual’s subjective choice is inseparably linked 
to objective criteria relevant to the person’s identity”.76 
                                                 
73 Decision no. 41/2012. (XII. 6.) of 4 December 2012, par. 24. 
74 Ibid., paras 25–26. 
75 Ibid., par. 30. 
76 Ibid., par. 29., referring to par. 35. of the Commentary on the 
Provisions of the Framework Convention. Available 
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Finally, what Justice Péter Kovács stated seven years 
earlier in one of his concurring opinions,77 now became 
part of a majority decision of the Constitutional Court 
(verbatim): „It is therefore obvious that [free self-
identification] is about the acceptance or rejection of 
one’s own inherited identity, i.e. one cannot be placed in 
a certain group by an outside pressure, against his or 
her own wishes.”78 The majority decision further 
recalled the recommendations of the European 
Commission on Racism and Intolerance as well as the 
recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe concerning the protection of personal 
data collected and processed for statistical purposes, and 
concluded that the registration of nationalities is not in 
itself problematic, on the contrary, it is actually 
necessary to fulfil Hungary’s international obligations. 
Considering previous experience on the implementation 
of the Minorities Act, the judges arrived at the same 
conclusion: „declaring one’s identity, safeguarded by 
proper data protection and other guarantees, is what 
can suppress the so called ethnobusiness and other 
dysfunctional phenomena”.79 
 
                                                                                             
at:https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/Display
DCTMContent?documentId=09000016800c10cf (last accessed: 14 
December 2019) 
77 Decision no. 45/2005. (XII. 14.) of 12 December 2005, Justice 
Péter Kovács’s concurring opinion, III/2/2. 
78 Decision no. 41/2012. (XII. 6.) of 4 December 2012, par. 29. 
79 Ibid., par. 43. 
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As for connecting the exercise of certain minority rights 
to census data, the Constitutional Court rejected the 
Minority Ombudsman’s argumentation with  
“unprecedented cynicism”80: „In the submission, in the 
comments of the national self-governments of certain 
nationalities, and in the mentioned document of the 
Venice Commission, it has been emphasized that when 
the enumerated persons gave their answers [to the 
question on minority affiliation], they were not aware 
that the result could have an impact on the establishment 
of minority self-governments. […] However, the 
Constitutional Court notes that even before carrying out 
the census, in 2010, the Government hadindicated that it 
would attach a much greater role to the census data, in 
fact, it would take it as a starting point for its actions.”81 
In sum, the majority of the judges opined that connecting 
the establishment of minority self-governments to census 
data does not violate the individual right of self-
determination. On the contrary, this may encourage 
citizens belonging to a given nationality in a particular 
settlement to exercise their right to minority self-
identification.82 From among the 15 judges, Justice 
István Stumpf alone considered that linking the elections 
of nationality self-governments to the census data was a 
disproportionate restriction on fundamental rights, not 
least because this made the exercise of fundamental 
rights subject to an unforeseeable condition.83 It seems 
                                                 
80 Pap 2014: 15. 
81 Decision no. 41/2012. (XII. 6.) of 4 December 2012, par. 36. 
82 Ibid., par. 45. 
83 Ibid., paras. 69–71. 
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that this anomaly was also felt by the majority because 
they included in the decision – as a sort of suggestion – 
that the legislator could in fact amend the law if there 
was a marked need for elections on behalf of 
nationalities in between two consecutive censuses.84 
 
Despite re-appearing constitutional concerns, the 
institution of minority registration seems to be accepted 
not only by the Constitutional Court but also by most 
scholars, as a necessary instrument of legal regulation, 
„the need for which is inherent in the nature of law 
itself”.85  
 
                                                 
84 Ibid., par. 54. The institution of nationality electoral roll was 
incidentally dealt with in Decision no. 1/2013. (I. 7.) of 4 January 
2013, which, based on a submission for ex ante constitutional 
review by Hungary’s President János Áder, examined the new 
(draft) law on the electoral procedure. Here, the Constitutional Court 
indirectly confirmed the role of minority registration in the exercise 
of fundamental rights: „through the application for registration on 
the electoral roll it can be ensured that nationalities living in 
Hungary can exercise their right provided for in Article XXIX (2) of 
the Fundamental Law, and that they could be represented in the 
Parliament in the manner defined [in the electoral law]”. (par. 77.) 
85 MAJTÉNYI – PAP 2006: 93. Majtényi and Pap also think that 
abandoning special minority rights and positive discrimination 
would entail returning to the theoretical premises from where the 
universal system of human rights protection started off after World 
War II, initially refusing to include minority rights. However, 
whether minority rights shall be considered as additional or special 
rights at all, is a subject of serious academic debate. Andrássy, for 
example, strongly opposes this notion of minority rights. See, 
Andrássy György: A nyelvszabadságról és a nyelvszabadság 
jelentőségéről. Létünk, 2013/különszám. 17. 
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6. Conclusions  
 
Hungary’s legislation on the protection of minorities are 
generally considered progressive and, we might add, 
quite comprehensive: the Constitution and sectoral laws 
provide for the rights of minorities, including the right to 
collective participation in public affairs, the fostering of 
their own culture, and the widespread use of their own 
language in various spheres of private and public 
language use. Nevertheless, there have been gaps in the 
regulation, which remain to be filled through the 
interpretative work of the Constitutional Court. The role 
of Hungary’s supreme judicial body is perhaps even 
more important when it comes tothe examination of the 
constitutionality of the relevant legal norms (through ex 
ante and ex post review). This is supposed to sort out 
dysfunctional elements in the regulation, and to 
guarantee that fundamental rights of minorities are 
indeed safeguarded, and that the concrete 
legislativesolutions are based on constitutional 
principles, thus building up a complex but coherent 
minority protection system.  
 
The identification of minority groups and of persons 
belonging to these groups is aninavoidable, logical first 
step in the process of exercising minority rights. If the 
law is not clear about the personal scope of legal 
protection, then the rights themselves become useless. 
This is where one would expect the Constitutional Court 
to take a firm stance, guiding the legislator in the course 
of the development of the detailed legal framework. 
However, based on the cases examined in this paper, 
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onemight conclude that the general attitude of the 
Constitutional Court towards minorities is characterized 
by a complete lack of judicial activism. In fact, the Court 
avoided substantive examination whenever possible, 
usually on the grounds that the petition or complaint did 
not contain a specific constitutional problem, the 
regulation of the matter in question belongs to the 
legislator’s competence, or, that it is not up to the Court 
to deal with practical issues. Although the Court many 
times had the opportunity to exercise its legal power to 
conduct ex officio examination or to extend the scope of 
the submission because of the factual context, it has 
practically never done so.86 
 
Another deficiency is that in its decisions the Court has 
rarely built upon the valuable experience of international 
minority protection mechanisms (not until 2012, 
anyways). This would be all the more important because 
Hungary is party to all relevant multi- and bilateral 
treaties on minority rights, therefore there are legally 
binding international obligations that the State has to 
consider when adopting and implementing laws on 
minorities. By disregarding the applicable international 
monitoring materials in its jurisprudence, the Court has 
practically given a free hand to the Hungarian 
legislature. This was also pointed out by Justice Péter 
Kovács in connection with free self-identification and 
                                                 
86 Judit Tóth is of the same opinion after reviewing the same and 
other Constitutional Court cases, as well. See, TÓTH, Judit: 
Kisebbségi jogok az Alkotmánybíróság előtt. In: Gyulavári – Kállai 
2010. 302–320, especially at 319–320. 
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minority registration in the form as the Constitutional 
Court of Hungary used these concepts: „From a 
constitutional point of view, and considering the 
requirement of compliance under Article 7 (1) of the 
Constitution, the avant-garde interpretation and 
unfounded »innovations« regarding the terms contained 
in international treaties are theoretically undesirable 
and in practice create serious problems. Since law-
makers and implementers cannot give an interpretation 
to an international treaty that is inconsistent with 
international law, they must pay particular attention to 
international documents in which the bodies authorized 
by the contracting parties provide interpretations. This 
obligation of consideration is independent of whether the 
international legal instrument containing it, in terms of 
its legal nature, directly imposes an obligation on 
Hungary or not”.87 
 
Turning to the two questions raised in this paper, the 
Constitutional Court has little to offer. Regarding the 
definition of minorities, the notorious term in the 
Constitution – “constituent parts of the State” – have not 
been elaborated by the Court, all we know is that this 
qualifies minorities for a special treatment (in relation to 
what?, how?), and that an essential requirement for 
minorities to fulfil such a role is representation. The 
exact content of the legal status of minorities as 
“constituent parts of the State” remains unclear. 
Furthermore, in the cases concerning the recognition of 
                                                 
87 Justice Péter Kovács’s dissenting opinion to the Constitutional 
Court’s Decision no. 45/2005. (XII. 14.), III/2/1. 
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the Jews, the Russians, the Bunjevacs and the Huns as 
national minorities, the Constitutional Court refused to 
pronounce itself on the content of the statutory 
conditions for being a minority. Instead of giving a 
constitutional interpretation of its own, the Court would 
use a circular reasoning, conveniently relying on the 
definition of the Minorities Act. 
 
As for the question of “who” (belongs to a minority), the 
Constitutional Court’s practice is premised on the free 
choice of identity. In light of the Court’s jurisprudence, 
minority affiliation is closely related to the right to self-
determination, and ultimately, to the right to human 
dignity. The institution of minority registration, that is, 
disclosure of personal data related to minority affiliation, 
is subject to the consent of the individual. However, 
within the limits set by the Constitution, the right to 
informational self-determination may be restricted and 
individuals may be obliged to declare their affiliation 
with a minority group, if the restriction is justified by 
compelling reasons in the protection of other 
constitutional rights and values, subject to the principles 
of necessity and proportionality. The right to establish 
minority self-governments can be the basis for 
restriction, however, the Court did not see one single 
solution following from the Constitution, so once again 
it conveniently relied on the legislator to regulate the 
details of minority registration. 
 
To conclude, by failing to provide a constitutional 
interpretation on the concept of minorities and precise 
guidelines on identifying persons belonging to national 
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minorities, that is, the very holders of minority rights, the 
Constitutional Court has in fact failed to define the 
constitutional minimum standards for the protection of 
minorities. This calls into question the role of this highly 
prestigious judicial body as the supreme guardian of 
minority rights in Hungary. 
